Sindoor’s New Red Lines Are Drawn

medium nocaption121083862When LeT terrorists struck in Kashmir on April 22, Pakistan had effectively jumped on the first rung of a familiar conflict escalation ladder. It did so with implausible deniability of its role. But this time was different. The two countries climbed perilously higher into conflict than they had done ever before this century. Between May 7 and 10, India demonstrated not only military precision and a technological edge, but also dominance of the escalation dynamics, coupled with a smart instinct to de-escalate once objectives were met. By Saturday evening, India had completed what it set out to do: target terrorists, enforce accountability, and reassert deterrence – without slipping into full-scale war.The operation was the latest chapter in an evolving doctrine that India has been shaping since 2016, when it first abandoned strategic restraint with cross-border surgical ground strikes responding to terrorism in Uri. Indeed, Op Sindoor may be seen as the next rung of Op Bandar – the air strikes in Balakot in 2019 that became shorthand for a bolder, more kinetic approach to deterrence. Each iteration has added layers of credibility and precision to India’s posture against cross-border terrorism, adding both punitive and pre-emptive elements to now reimpose credible deterrence. The posture has shifted from strategic ambiguity to one of conditional clarity: Cross-border terror will invite cross-border consequences.New normal | Act of terror is act of war. * Op Sindoor showed depth and daring in execution, ending with Indian strikes on Pakistan’s air bases deep inside its territory. Yet, the operation was not reckless. It reflected a strategic maturity: inflict pain, send a message, but leave an exit ramp open.* What India has demonstrated is capability with restraint. This combination of credible threat and managed risk is a significant departure from the ambiguous policies of the past, which too often conflated strategic patience with passivity. The message now is of zero tolerance to terrorism, with each attack to be treated as an act of war. This is the new Sindoor normal.* Pause in the shooting doesn’t imply India has eased all its pressure points. ‘Abeyance’ of Indus Waters Treaty remains in place. No hydrological data is being shared. And new water infra projects on Chenab and Jhelum rivers may commence – opening a long-term front even as India renegotiates its upper riparian generosity. The flow of water may be calibrated to Pakistan’s behaviour on terrorism.Global powers, local battles | International response to Sindoor was swift – and revealing. * US, UK and Saudi Arabia moved quickly to validate India’s right to counter terrorism and exert pressure on Pakistan. The script on US’s role remains familiar. Since the 1998 nuclear tests, American reflexes in South Asia have defaulted to rapid de-escalation efforts. In 1999, Bill Clinton became India’s advocate to lean on Nawaz Sharif to lean on his then army chief Musharraf to withdraw troops from Kargil heights. * After the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, accompanying India’s coercive deployment with Op Parakram, US pressed Musharraf to swear that Pakistan territory would not be used for terrorism against India.In 2019, former state secretary Mike Pompeo spoke to both India’s foreign minister and Pakistan’s army chief late at night, aiming to de-risk what he thought was a potential nuclear escalation. Even if such tales are embellished, they illustrate how America has seen itself: as a crisis manager, an honest broker de-risking a nuclear situation.* This time round, Trump had the fastest finger first on his social media account to claim his role in precipitating the ceasefire. But as in Kargil and Balakot, US role was to support the pressure of India’s military actions. Like after Op Bandar, India’s military actions, or their threat, drove Pakistan’s request for a ceasefire. Simultaneously, global players, particularly US and Saudi Arabia, played a crucial role in amplifying India’s message, pressing Islamabad further. In fact, India activated a spectrum of diplomatic pressure levers. Reports suggest Washington leveraged the billion-dollar tranche of IMF assistance to Pakistan, conditioning its release on an immediate de-escalation. The message was blunt: Islamabad’s economic lifelines now depend on its military behaviour.A fragile, functional equilibrium | India would indulge Trump’s ‘mediation’ offers, but only up to a point. It doesn’t seek mediation, only pressure on terrorism. Any effort to internationalise Kashmir remains a red line for Delhi. * Pakistan, by contrast, embraces external involvement. It needs the optics. It declares every Western phone call a validation of its global stature, just as it rebrands military defeats as victories. The Pakistani military’s propaganda wing, ISPR, will undoubtedly package Op Bunyan Ul Marsoos as an unqualified victory – short war, operational brilliance, and global attention. * The same logic was deployed to claim triumph in 1965, 1971, and 1999, each a setback to Pakistan’s army. What really matters is control of the domestic narrative.* As India celebrates Op Sindoor, its strategic choices and operational success will be robustly debated. Across the border, Pakistan will project General Asim Munir as victor – he’ll expect that this limited conflict has bolstered his authority. It plays into long-standing paranoia about India, casting the army as the nation’s sole saviour.India has now made a doctrinal pivot in its fight against terrorism. India does not need war – or passive restraint. It has delivered a credible, coercive slap against terrorism. But will that prevent the next Pahalgam? Will it make Pakistan rethink the costs of using terrorism as strategy? For India, deterrence is not about spectacle. It has reshaped the adversary’s calculus.The writer is former high commissioner to Pakistan